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Abstract
The Australian system of horizontal fiscal equalization (HFE) transfers output from low
to high cost states. This paper develops a standard model of a federation with an imperfectly
mobile population and states which capture economic rents from natural resources and
recycle the revenue on the basis of residency. A federal agency, which can be thought of
as mimicking the role of the Commonwealth Grants Commission, chooses an inter-state
transfer to maximize national social welfare. The contribution of the paper is to show that
under the assumptions of the model, the optimal transfer to a state is increasing in its costs,
for given costs in other states. This supports the notion of inter-state transfers in favour of
high cost states. However, the result does not necessarily validate the magnitude of transfers
that we see in practice in the Australian federation.
Key Words: federalism, intergovernmental relations, inter-governmental differentials and
their effects, federal state relations.
JEL: H73, H77.
1 Introduction
In 2015-16, the Commonwealth Government is anticipated to allocate $57,200 million of Goods
and Services Tax (GST) revenue as unconditional general revenue grants to the states for services
such as education and health.1 This revenue is distributed using the principles of horizontal
fiscal equalization (HFE) which nominally allocates the entire GST revenue pool on an equal
per capita basis and then subtracts or adds revenue for each state according to whether it has
above or below average fiscal capacity. In this way, the HFE system equalizes the fiscal capacity
of the states so that they have approximately similar ability to provide the average level of
services to their citizens while imposing an average tax burden.
To achieve equalization of fiscal capacities, HFE in effect redistributes income across states.
A measure of this redistribution is illustrated in Table 1 for 2015-16. The first row shows the
grant that would have been made to each state under an equal per capita allocation of the GST
pool while the second row shows the actual grant expected to be received with HFE. The third
1In this paper, states are assumed to include the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory.
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row of the Table provides an indication of the redistributive effect of equalization relative to an
equal per capita benchmark. From this, one can see that income is redistributed away from New
South Wales, Victoria and Western Australia, states deemed to have higher than average fiscal
capacity, in favour of all the other states which are deemed to have below average fiscal capacity.
One can also see that $6,858 million, or 11.9% of the GST revenue pool, is redistributed across
states in order to achieve approximate equalization of state fiscal capacities.
Table 1: Inter-state redistribution arising from HFE, 2015-16
NSW Vic Qld WA SA Tas ACT NT Redist
$m $m $m $m $m $m $m $m $m
Equal per capita 18,200 14,234 11,525 6,425 4,050 1,224 942 599
Grant with HFE 17,311 12,755 13,046 1,935 5,525 2,236 1,040 3,351
Redistribution -899 -1,479 1,521 -4,490 1,475 1,012 98 2,752 6,858
Note: Redistribution of $6,858 million is the sum of the positive (or negative) terms in the
redistribution row.
Source: Commonwealth Grants Commission (2015), Table 1, Chapter 3, page 76.
In Table 2, the inter-state redistribution induced by HFE is dissected further for each state
according to its source within the equalization methodology; namely, (i) revenue needs; (ii)
expenditure needs - consisting of socio-demographic features of state populations and differences
in inter-state costs; and (iii) the impact of other Commonwealth payments. It can be seen that,
for a number of states, inter-state cost differences are a major cause of deviation from what
they would receive under an equal per capita approach, and hence a significant factor behind
the pattern of inter-state redistribution.
For example, the relatively low cost status of New South Wales is the single most important
reason why its grant is less than what it would be under an equal per capita system. Western
Australia’s requirement for additional revenue because of high costs ($2,953 million) offsets
38.3% of its negative revenue need of $7,714 million. Cost is also the second most important
reason why Victoria and the Northern Territory deviate from their equal per capita share of
the GST pool.
Table 2: Inter-state redistribution by source and state, 2015-16
NSW Vic Qld WA SA Tas ACT NT
Revenue Needs 1,638 3,366 43 -7,714 1,598 694 291 85
Expend Needs:
Socio -1,121 -2,858 1,552 294 416 524 -453 1,644
Costs -1,844 -2,046 0 2,953 -407 -168 210 1,304
Comm Payments 438 59 -74 -22 -132 -38 -51 -282
Redistribution -889 -1,479 1,521 -4,490 1,475 1,021 98 2,752
Source: Commonwealth Grants Commission (2015), Table 4, Chapter 3, page 80.
What emerges from the discussion above is that equalization for differences in inter-state
costs causes a significant portion of the redistribution arising from the application of HFE to
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distributing the GST pool. However, the allocative efficiency implications of redistribution
based on inter-state cost differences - or cost equalization - have received scant attention. There
is some evidence that policy makers are aware of a link between equalization for cost differences
and allocative efficiency. For example, this was raised, and discussed briefly, during a review
of the GST distribution process in 2012 (Commonwealth of Australia (2012)). From its terms
of reference, it appears the yet to be released Federation White Paper also has the capacity to
consider cost equalization and allocative efficiency (Commonwealth of Australia (2015)).
Most economists would consider cost equalization, and the induced redistribution highlighted
in Table 2, to be a source of inefficiency since it encourages more output in high cost states.
This view is sometimes expressed in the fiscal federalism literature by way of general comment.2
A different argument is put by Petchey (1995) who shows that there are cases where efficiency
actually requires transfers in favour of high cost jurisdictions. Other than this, it seems fair to
say there has been no particular focus in the literature on cost equalisation and efficiency.
In view of this apparent gap, and the importance of cost equalization in many federations
in practice, particularly Australia, the objective of this paper is to take a closer look at the
relationship between allocative efficiency and cost equalization. This is achieved by developing
a standard model of a federation in the tradition of the efficiency-in-migration literature, as
surveyed in Boadway (2004). To capture the Australian setting, the model has two states
which differ in terms of their production technologies and endowments of a fixed factor, which
is assumed to be a natural resource. As in Mansoorian and Myers (1993), the population has
some attachment to state and hence is imperfectly mobile. State governments are assumed to
capture economic rents arising from their resources and to distribute these rents to citizens on
the basis of residency. This means resource rents distort migration decisions. As is known from
the efficiency-in-migration literature, this requires a corrective inter-state transfer to establish
first best allocative efficiency. It is supposed that a central agency chooses the inter-state
transfer to maximize national social welfare which is the weighted sum of social welfare in each
state. One can think of the agency as mimicking the role of the CGC in the Australian federal
system, albeit with a different objective.
The contribution of the paper is to use the first order necessary condition from the agency’s
optimization problem to examine the effect of a cost increase in any one state on the direction
of the optimal inter-state transfer. This produces general expressions showing how the transfer
responds to a state-specific cost increase. From this, it is shown that the optimal transfer
received by a state is an increasing function of its cost, for a given cost structure in the other
state. It is concluded that, under the model’s assumptions, social welfare maximization requires
the optimal inter-state transfer to redistribute income from low to high cost states. This is
consistent with the HFE methodology in Australia, as shown in Table 2. However, it is noted
that this does not necessarily validate the magnitude of the cost equalization transfers that we
see in practice.
The paper is set out as follows. Section 2 develops a model of a federal economy. Section 3
2See, for example, Albouy (2012) page 827.
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presents the key results and Section 4 discusses assumptions, extensions and policy implications.
Section 5 concludes while mathematical details are placed in Annexes.
2 Model
Consider a federation with i = 1, 2 states and a given homogeneous population, N. Each person
supplies one unit of labour so N is the fixed supply of labour for the federation. Denoting ni
as the labour supply of state i, and setting N = 1 for convenience, the following labour supply
constraint holds:
n1 + n2 = 1. (2.1)
The production process in each state uses two inputs, mobile labour and a fixed factor, Ti,
which is assumed to be a natural resource. These inputs are combined to produce a numeraire
using the continuous and concave production function,
fi(ni, Ti) i = 1, 2. (2.2)
Supposing the numeraire has a given price of one, fi(ni, Ti) also defines the value of output
in state i. It is assumed that the wage rate in state i is equal to the marginal product, that is,
∂fi(ni, Ti)
∂ni
= wi > 0. (2.3)
As in Boadway et al. (2003), economic rent arising from the natural resource in state i,
πi = fi(ni, Ti)− wini i = 1, 2, (2.4)
accrues to that state’s government. This could be by way of direct ownership of the natural
resource, as is the case in Australia where states own on-shore natural resources such as iron
ore or coal, or because states use taxes that capture the economic rent. In practice, there is no
constraint on Australian states from levying, say, a resource rent tax. In general they do not,
but the taxes they do levy on natural resources, such as value of production royalties, can be
thought of as proxies which the states use to charge a rental, πi/Ti, for the extraction of natural
resources owned by them.
As an example, in 2013-14, Western Australia, the dominant resource rich state, raised
$7,204 million from royalties and grants in lieu of royalties from natural resource extraction.
The latter included payments to the state from the Commonwealth for tax revenue raised by
the Commonwealth from the North West Shelf. This revenue, a large potion of which is likely
to include economic rent, made up approximately 26% of the state’s total revenue base in that
year. It was used by the state to fund services that benefit state residents, including migrants.
To capture this recycling of economic rents arising from natural resources to residents through
state budgets, it is also assumed in this paper that state i redistributes the rents it captures
on a lump sum, equal per capita, basis to residents of the state. From the model set up, these
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rents are enjoyed by existing citizens and recent migrants alike.
Suppose a federal agency redistributes output from state 1 to 2 using a lump sum self-
financing inter-state transfer, denoted as ρ. Note that ρ can be either positive or negative.
When ρ > 1, output is transferred from state 1 to 2, but when when ρ < 1 output is reallocated
from state 2 to 1. As will be shown below, the agency is assumed to make its transfer choice to
maximize national social welfare.
The residents of state i receive their wage income, wini, plus the state’s economic rent,
which, as noted above, is recycled to them on an equal per capita lump sum basis by the state’s
government. In other words, residents receive the state’s numeraire output, fi(ni, Ti), as income.
Taking into account the transfer of numeraire undertaken by the federal agency, net income in
state 1 is f1(n1, T1) − ρ while in state 2 it is f2(n2, T2) + ρ. In each state, this is transformed
into a pure private good, xi, which has a given per unit cost of ci, for i = 1, 2. Note that the
private good could also be considered as a vector of private goods, some of which might be state
provided services.
The feasible constraint for state 1 requires the total value of expenditure on the private
good to be equal to output of the numeraire, net of the inter-state transfer, that is: c1x1n1 =
f1(n1, T1) − ρ. Similarly, the feasible constraint for state 2 is c2x2n2 = f2(n2, T2) + ρ. Per
capita consumption of the private good in state i, identical across all residents of the state, can,




i = 1, 2. (2.5)
Residents of state i have homogeneous preferences described by the continuous and strictly
concave utility function,
ui(xi) i = 1, 2. (2.6)
Imperfect population mobility with attachment to place, as in Mansoorian and Myers (1993),
implies the migration constraint, u1(x1)+a(1−n1) = u2(x2)+an1, must also be satisfied where
0 6 a is the standard attachment parameter. If a = 0, the population is perfectly mobility
and the migration constraint is simply u1(x1) = u2(x2). Using the definition of per capita
consumption from equation (2.5), and n2 = 1−n1 from equation (2.1), the migration constraint






+ a1(1− n1) = u2
(




From equation (2.7), n1 is, implicitly, a function of the inter-state transfer conditional on
the cost parameters, fixed natural resource endowments and the given attachment parameter;
that is, one can define:
n1(ρ : ci, Ti, a) i = 1, 2. (2.8)
The implication is that one can totally differentiate the migration condition and obtain expres-
sions which show how n1, and hence n2, respond to changes in the transfer or parameters.
It is clear from the discussion above, and in particular equation (2.5), that residents of a state
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earn the state’s average product; that is, output per capita adjusted by the transfer and costs.
It is well-known from the efficiency-in-migration literature, that this means any distribution of
the population in which equation (2.7) is satisfied, is spatially inefficient. This is, in essence,
because of the assumed distribution of economic rents by states to citizens based on residency.
Since this is a well-known result, it is not explained further here. However, the interested reader
can consult the detailed discussion in Petchey and Shapiro (2006) for an explanation. As will be
seen later in the paper, this means there is an efficiency case for a corrective inter-state transfer
in this model. It is the purpose of the paper to explore the relationship between this corrective
(or optimal) transfer and changes in costs in either state.
Finally, it is assumed that the federal agency moves first and chooses ρ while mobile labour
selects its location after the agency has made its transfer choice. The agency correctly anticipates
the migration responses to its choices while mobile labour makes its location choice to satisfy
the migration constraint conditional on the transfer.
This completes the description of the basic model. Its salient features are as follows. A
homogeneous population supplies one unit of labour to the state it resides in, consumes a pure
private good and settles itself across states to equate per capita utility adjusted for attachment
to state. The production process in each state uses a fixed input (natural resource) and mobile
labour to produce a numeraire. State governments have a simple role; namely, they fully capture
all local economic rent and redistribute it via their budgets to citizens on the basis of residency.
This is a simple assumption designed to capture the essence of what happens at the state level
in Australia with respect to the taxation of natural resources. It means that mobile residents
earn the state’s average product, adjusted by the inter-state transfer and costs, as income.
This means economic rents distort migration decisions, and there is a role for a non-zero inter-
state corrective transfer to maximize social welfare. The next Section of the paper derives the
optimal transfer from a social welfare maximization problem and examines how it responds to
cost changes in each state.
3 Effects of a cost increase on the optimal transfer
This Section of the paper characterises an optimization problem for the federal agency in which
it chooses an inter-state transfer. The analysis then examines how the optimal transfer responds
to a change in the cost structure in either state. The agency is assumed to choose the transfer
to maximise national social welfare which is the weighted sum of utilities for a representative
resident from each state. One can think of the agency in this stylized model as mimicking the
role of the CGC in the Australian federation.3
Given this, and noting once more that n2 = 1− n1 from equation (2.1). the federal agency
3Of course, the CGC does not explicitly pursue social welfare maximization. Rather, it has the goal of
equalizing state fiscal capacities.
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subject to the migration constraint, (2.7), where W is a social welfare function and 0 < δ < 1 is
a parameter which denotes the weight given to each state. In restricting δ from taking extreme
values of one or zero, I have ruled out malevolence on the part of the agency. In pursuing its
objective, the agency will always care about both states, though to varying degrees. This seems
to be reasonable: it is difficult to imagine Australian policy makers deliberately constructing
policy to completely exclude the interests of any one group, albeit a state in this case. That
said, by varying the welfare weight between zero and one the inter-state distribution of income
implied by a given transfer will change. In this sense, the federal agency cares about inter-state
equity, but only in terms of redistributing along a utility possibilities frontier defined between
representative residents of states 1 and 2. Any point on the frontier must also be consistent
with the migration constraint, equation (2.7). With attachment to state, this is not necessarily
a point on the frontier where per capita utilities are equal across states, as would be so with
perfect mobility where a = 0.
A solution to the agency’s maximisation problem yields the following first order necessary


















µ1 = (w1 − c1x1), µ2 = (w2 − c2x2), (3.3)
are the marginal social benefits from adding a unit of labour to states 1 and 2 respectively. For
each state, this consists of the contribution of a marginal unit of labour to output (their wage,
wi) less the value of their per capita consumption, cixi.
Total differentiation of the migration constraint, equation (2.7), yields the federal agency’s

























Using this migration response, the first order necessary condition for the transfer, equation
(3.2), can be expressed in the following form:








4Mathematical details of the solution are available on request.
7
This is the well-known condition for a spatially efficient equalization transfer with attach-
ment to place (see, for example, expression (26) in Caplan et al. (2000)). The federal agency
chooses a transfer, ρ∗, which satisfies this condition. The transfer is efficiency enhancing in the
sense that it corrects for the distorting effects of economic rents captured by state governments
and redistributed on the basis of residency. Except in the fully symmetric case, the transfer
that satisfies this first order necessary condition is non-zero and could be in either direction
(from state 1 to 2 or vice versa) depending on the distribution of natural resource endowments,
as given by Ti, for i = 1, 2, differences in relative costs, as determined by ci, for i = 1, 2, and
the value of the attachment parameter, a.
The model developed to this point is completely standard. No pretence is made that it
contributes to the theory of fiscal federalism in any way. Rather, the contribution of this paper
is to undertake a comparative static exercise using the first order necessary condition for the
transfer, equation (3.5), to show how ρ∗ responds to an exogenously given increase in the cost
parameter in either state. Consider first an increase in c1, for given c2.
3.1 Cost increase in state 1
































is the sum of the marginal benefit responses to a change in labour supply for each state and
A > 0 and D are as defined at equation (3.4).
As shown in Annex 2, existence of a stable migration equilibrium requires µi < 0 for i = 1, 2
and hence that the federation is over-populated. In turn, this means that D, defined at equation
(3.4), must also be negative. From the Annex, stability is also assured if H, defined at equation
(3.9), is negative. If these restrictions hold, from equation (3.8) we know that Fρ > 0. However,
even with H < 0 and D < 0, the sign of Fc1 is, in general, ambiguous. This means that the
sign of ∂ρ∂c1 , the comparative static derivative of interest, is also ambiguous. That said, one can
unambiguously sign Fc1 , and hence
∂ρ
∂c1
, if the population is perfectly mobile. This is shown in
the following proposition:
5See Annex 1 for details of derivations.
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Proposition 1. If H < 0 and D < 0, perfect population mobility is sufficient to ensure that
the inter-state transfer from state 1 to 2 is decreasing in the cost structure of state 1. That is,






Proof. If a = 0, the term 2a(1− δ)n1 in equation (3.7) is equal to zero. If H < 0 and D < 0, it
follows that Fc1 > 0. Since Fρ is always positive, the result follows immediately.
Thus, perfect mobility is sufficient (though not necessary) to ensure that an increase in c1
results in a decrease in ρ. Since ρ is set up in the model as a transfer from state 1 to 2, this means
that as c1 increases, less income is transferred out of state 1, or alternatively, more income is
transferred into the state depending on the initial sign of ρ. In other words, the transfer made
from state 1 to 2 is decreasing in c1.
However, it is reasonable to expect positive attachment (a > 0). In this more general case,
the signs of Fc1 and hence
∂ρ
∂c1
are ambiguous. Further insight for this case can be obtained from




i , with 0 < α
and 0 < β being the usual labour and capital share parameters.6 Results from a simulation
are presented in Table 3 for a case in which state 1 also has a relatively larger natural resource
endowment. The first row of the Table reproduces values for the transfer, state populations
and social welfare where states have the same costs, that is, c1 = c2 = 1, but state 1 has a
higher endowment of the fixed factor. Social welfare maximization requires the federal agency to
transfer income from the resource rich state to the state with a smaller fixed factor endowment.
Table 3: State 1 is resource rich, high cost
c1 ρ n1 n2 W
1 0.2720 6.1324 3.8676 4.0271
1.1 0.2050 5.8089 4.1902 3.9565
1.2 0.1431 5.5193 4.4807 3.8446
1.3 0.0867 5.2590 4.7410 3.7067
1.4 0.0360 5.0265 4.9735 3.5545
1.5 -0.0094 4.8192 5.1808 3.3960
The remaining rows illustrate how the endogenous variables respond to increases in c1 while
holding c2 fixed at one. In other words, state 1 becomes increasingly high cost relative to state
2. It is clear that the transfer made by the agency from state 1 to 2, because of the relatively
high resource endowment of state 1, decreases as c1 increases. Nevertheless, people still migrate
to state 2 as costs increase in state 1. Social welfare also decreases because as costs in one state
this reduces the real value of consumption.
6To enable replication of results, mathematical details of the numerical example and relevant Matlab code are
available on request. The example assumes that N = 10, T1 = 4, T2 = 2, α = 0.5, β = 0.6, δ = 0.5, c2 = 1 and
a = 0.001. Thus, the central agency cares equally about states and state 1 has a 50 percent higher endowment of
the natural resource than state 2. Note the results do not depend on constant, increasing or decreasing returns
to scale.
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3.2 Cost increase in state 2










{H − 2a ((1− δ)c1 + δc2)}+ 2aδn2, (3.11)
As with state 1, even with H < 0 and D < 0, the sign of Fc2 is ambiguous. However, once
again if there is perfect mobility Fc2 can be signed unambiguously as follows:
Proposition 2. If H < 0 and D < 0, perfect population mobility is sufficient for the transfer







Proof. If a = 0, the term 2aδn2 in equation (3.11) is equal to zero. If H < 0 and D < 0, it
follows that Fc2 < 0. Since Fρ is always positive, the result is immediate.
For the more general case where a > 0, a numerical example can once more be used to
see how endogenous variable values respond to an increase in c2. The example uses the same
functional forms and parameter values as the simulation in Table 3. The only difference is that
c1 is now held fixed at one and c2 is increased. Results of the simulation are presented in Table
4.
Table 4: State 2 is resource poor, high cost
c2 ρ n1 n2 W
1 0.2720 6.1324 3.8676 4.0271
1.1 0.3348 6.4370 3.5630 3.6795
1.2 0.3887 6.7115 3.2885 3.3494
1.3 0.4346 6.9599 3.0401 3.0427
1.4 0.4737 7.1866 2.8134 2.7612
1.5 0.5072 7.3966 2.6034 2.5038
From the first row, which is the same as row 1 in Table 3, social welfare maximization
requires the federal agency to transfer income from state 1 to 2 because state 1 has the larger
resource endowment. The remaining rows show how the optimal transfer, state populations and
social welfare respond to increases in c2. Clearly, the transfer to state 2 increases. Not only is
state 1 resource rich, which in itself necessitates a transfer to state 2, it is now also relatively
low cost, thus reinforcing the need for a transfer to state 2 in order to maximize national social
welfare. As c2 increases, people also migrate out of the high cost state 2 into state 1. Finally,
as with the simulation in Table 3, social welfare is decreasing in c2 for the reason already given.
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3.3 Summary
This completes the results of the paper. They can be summarized as follows. From the propo-
sitions, if there is perfect population mobility the optimal transfer from state 1 to 2 is always
decreasing in the cost parameter in state 1 and increasing in the cost parameter in state 2. This
is an unambiguous result which holds given the general assumptions of the model. Given the
way the transfer is set up, this means that with perfect mobility we can be sure the transfer
received by any state is increasing in its cost parameter, for given costs elsewhere.7 For the
more general case of positive attachment, the transfer to a state is also increasing in its cost
parameter, for given costs in the other states, though it was only possible to show this with a
numerical example which assumes a particular production technology in each state.
The intuition for the result is as follows. When, for example, c1 increases, we can see from
equation (2.5) that per capita consumption in state 1, x1, decreases. This is because, for a given
transfer to (or from) state 1, real income in the state falls. Recall also that this income consists
of wages and economic rent. From the migration constraint at equation (2.7), people will want
to migrate from state 1 to 2, and the simulations show that this is what happens. However, the
cost increase in state 1 decreases the real value of its economic rent, relative to the real value of
rent in state 2. Part of the migration that would occur without any change in the transfer into
state 2 would be in response to this change in the relative real value of rents. This, we know
from the efficiency-in-migration literature, would be inefficient migration and the agency stops
this by making a greater transfer into state 1 to compensate for its lower real rent value. In
effect, by transferring more income into state 1 in response to its cost increase, the agency is
able to stop that component of the migration into state 2 that is inefficient (i.e. in response to
real rent value differentials), leaving only the efficient part associated with changes in the real
value of wage income. The same logic applies to an increase in c2, for given c1.
4 Assumptions, model features and policy
The results are obtained from a model which makes some simplifying assumptions. Two are
worthy of further comment.
Firstly, the model has no public goods, so the role of states is restricted to capturing and
recycling economic rents arising from a fixed factor, assumed to a natural resource, to citizens on
the basis of residency. An extension could be undertaken to include local public goods though
this will be at the cost of added complexity. To be more specific, it would add an additional
source of distortion to migration equilibria arising from fiscal externalities making the first order
condition for the transfer more complex. It is unclear how changes in relative costs across states
would then affect the relative real value of these externalities, and hence what influence they
would exert on the direction of the transfer response to changes in relative inter-state costs.
For instance, would they reinforce or tend to offset the directional changes related to economic
7This makes it clear why Petchey (1995) finds that the transfer should go to the high cost state. He assumes
that the population is perfectly mobile, that is, a = 0, so propositions 1 and 2 hold in his model.
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rents? What is more, if one believes state services are largely publicly provided private goods (or
highly congested public goods), the fiscal externality distortions to migration equilibria arising
from the introduction of local public goods would be relatively small compared to the impact
of differential rents in a resource-based economy such as Australia.
Secondly, I have assumed state costs are exogenously given using a parameter. While fixing
costs is fairly standard in the efficiency-in-migration literature, more generally one would expect
costs to be endogenous and a function of state and federal policies, at least in part. In a world
with cost equalization and endogenous costs, states might then be able to act strategically with
respect to their costs and distort their policies to influence their cost equalization transfer.
Cost equalisation may in this case also generate negative welfare effects which would have to
be offset against the gain identified in this paper under the assumption of given costs. Whether
cost equalization is efficiency enhancing in net terms when costs are endogenous is beyond the
scope of this paper and remains to be explored as future research. Even so, in a world with
endogenous costs, one would still expect the results here to hold: it is just that the benefit of
cost equalization identified here would have to be offset against the costs of strategic behaviour
that it may encourage.
Though not an assumption, a feature of the model developed in this paper is that states
fully capture local economic rents and recycle them to locals on the basis of residency. This
creates the need for a non-zero corrective inter-state transfer to maximize national social welfare
simply because rents find their way into residents’ income and distort migration decisions. The
paper has argued that the Australian federation works in this way, namely, that resource rich
states do capture economic rents and disburse them on the basis of residency. However, it must
be recognized that if the Australian economy does not work like this and resource rich states do
not capture a significant amount of economic rent, then in a model without local public goods,
the optimal transfer is zero. In this case, there can, of course, be no efficiency rational for cost
equalization. Hence, the case for cost equalization hangs critically upon the ability of states to
capture and disburse significant economic rent on the basis of residency.
The general policy implication is that by transferring income from low to high cost states,
cost equalization undertaken as part of HFE in Australia has the potential to increase national
social welfare. Provided that the CGC has correctly identified high and low cost states, this
means that the signs of expenditure needs arising from cost differences shown in Table 2 are right
if our aim is to maximize social welfare as defined by W in the agency’s optimization problem.
Naturally, this does not necessarily validate the magnitude of expenditure needs arising from
cost differences shown in Table 2, only their sign.
5 Conclusion
After developing a standard efficiency-in-migration model of a federation with imperfect popu-
lation mobility and two states that capture and recycle natural resource rents on the basis of
residency, this paper has derived an expression for the optimal inter-state equalization transfer
needed to maximize national social welfare. The main contribution has been to obtain general
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expressions that tell us how the optimal transfer responds to a change in the cost structure in
either state. It has been shown that if the population is perfectly mobile, the transfer is unam-
biguously increasing in a state’s relative cost structure. More generally, if population mobility
is imperfect, numerical examples have been used to show that the transfer to a state is still
increasing in its relative cost structure. Given these results, which, as explained, depend upon
the model’s assumptions and the ability of states to capture and recycle economic rents, it is
concluded that cost equalization may enhance national social welfare.
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Annex 1: Derivations
Consider state 1. Using (3.5) in the main text, and assuming that uxi = 1 for i = 1, 2, the


































































































Totally differentiating the migration constraint yields the migration response to an increase in











{H − 2a ((1− δ)c1 + δc2)} − 2a(1− δ)n1.


















































Now consider state 2. From equation (3.5) in the main text, and assuming that uxi = 1 for









{H − 2a ((1− δ)c1 + δc2)}+ 2aδn2,
and Fρ is as defined above.
Annex 2: Stability of a migration equilibrium
From the main text, once the federal agency has chosen a ρ∗ to satisfy equation (3.5), then
from equation (2.8), the supply of labour to state 1 is also determined. Mobile labour makes its
location choice for a given equilibrium equalization transfer to satisfy the migration constraint.
This manifests itself as a solution, n1(ρ
∗ : ci, ρ), to equation (2.8) which yields the labor supply
to state 1. This also implies an equilibrium labour supply to state 2. Together, these labour
supplies constitute a migration equilibrium.
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Under what conditions will a unique, stable, solution exist? The answer begins by observing
that indirect utility for a resident of state i is,
Vi(ni) = Max
ρ∗
ui i = 1, 2.













where xi is per capita consumption as defined at equation (2.5) text and µi is the social marginal
benefit of a migrant as defined at equation (3.3). From Wildasin (1986), xi is strictly concave














< 0 i = 1, 2









i = 1, 2
From Boadway and Flatters (1982), migration equilibria are stable in over-populated feder-
ations where µi < 0 for i = 1, 2. This, in turn, implies from the equation above that
∂µi
∂ni
< 0 i = 1, 2 (.1)
in a stable migration equilibrium. What is more, if µi < 0 for i = 1, 2, it is also the case that
D < 0; H < 0 (.2)
where D and H are defined at equations (3.4) and (3.9) in the text.
8See pages 22 to 28 and in particular diagram 3 on page 26 in Wildasin (1986).
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